We show how trade credit use depends on the value of collateral in a repossession, as well as the extent to which firms face adverse selection problems when dealing with an outside investor. The theory explains: why trade credit is short term credit, why firms simultaneously take and extend credit to other firms with similar levels of creditworthiness, why firms whose prospects start to deteriorate, often respond by increasing the extent to which they offer trade credit to their buyers. The theory implies that in developing economies it may be efficient for suppliers to act as financial intermediaries. Trade credit economizes on the need to raise funds from inefficient financial markets while still permitting profitable real transactions to take place.
I. Introduction
When one firm sells a product to another, the buying firm does not realize the revenues attributable to the purchase immediately. If the buyer is a retailer, this may reflect the time the good sits on a shelf prior to a final sale to a customer. If the buyer is a manufacturer, this may reflect the time the good sits in inventory, the time the good is being physically reprocessed, and the time it takes to deliver the good. To fill the gap in timing, requires financing. Investors could fund that gap by the provision of credit to the buyer, in which case the good is sold for cash. Alternatively investors could fund that gap by the provision of funds to the seller, who in turn extends trade credit to the buyer. The question in this paper is, under what circumstances will one approach or the other dominate?
The central idea in this paper is that the manner in which this gap is filled is determined by the interaction between the legal rights of the parties (seller, buyer, outside investor), and the adverse selection problems associated with assessing the creditworthiness of the seller and the buyer. The legal rights are important because they determine what happens to the good in the event that the buyer defaults. The original seller is relatively well positioned to deal with these goods while an outside investor is not. This tends to favor the use of trade credit. In order to fund the trade credit the seller need to raise funds. This can create an adverse selection problem that works against the use of trade credit. In equilibrium these effects must both be taken into account.
More broadly, both the selling and the buying firm each potentially have an adverse selection problem in the dealings with outside investors. Because these firms interact through the sale of the good, they can in effect choose how important each of these adverse selection effects will be.
The use of trade credit is a mechanism that serves to mitigate the overall damage due to adverse selection. As a result, firms facing severe adverse selection in financial markets may still be able to obtain financing indirectly. The extent to which this can happen depends on the property rights defined by the legal system. An important element in our analysis is that the creditworthiness of the buyers creates problems for the financing of the sellers. The seller would like to extend more trade credit than the investor would like him to extend. We refer to this as the relending problem. The investor provides less financing for trade credit than the seller would prefer, and so the seller must restrict the offers of trade credit to some extent.
Where does the reduction due to the relending problem take place? It takes place where it causes less damage. Highly creditworthy buyers can get credit on good terms from elsewhere, and so they have less need for trade credit. In the equilibrium the less credit worthy buyers will tend to take more credit "paying late", while the higher creditworthiness buyers will tend to take less credit "paying on time". Preve (2003) shows that in fact financially distressed firms do tend to take more trade credit.
It is well known that firms in financial difficulty delay paying their bills. Sometimes it is suggested that this reflects inadequate toughness on the part of sellers in collecting. It is argued that greater toughness would be profitable. In our analysis the delay is part of the equilibrium rather than the result of inadequate toughness.
A second important element in our analysis is that trade credit implies that the long term financing of the firm interacts with the firms product market policies. To illustrate this idea we reconsider the adverse selection problem of Myers and Majluf (1984) but with two firms that are trading with each other in the product market. If only the seller had an adverse selection problem then the buyer would raise funds and the good would be sold for cash. If only the buyer had an adverse selection problem then trade credit would be used.
What happens if both have some degree of an adverse selection problem in their dealings with the investor? In each case the buyer must raise more than the seller to finance the transaction since the buyer needs to directly raise both the production costs and the seller's profit while the seller only needs to raise the production costs. When extending trade credit, the profit component can be self-financed. Thus the equilibrium depends on how the production cost compares to the buyer's valuation of the good.
If the seller has significant market power and a high markup then he is very eager to sell. The seller offers to sell either, for cash or on trade credit. Which of these is taken depends on whether the buyer considers himself to be well-treated by the outside investor. A buyer who is overvalued by the market raises funds in the market, and pays cash for the good. An undervalued buyer takes the trade credit.
At the other extreme suppose that the seller has almost no market power. The financial market's treatment of the seller is critical. If the seller is being overvalued then once again he may be eager to sell, and thus willing to sell for cash or on trade credit. However if the seller is undervalued by the investor, borrowing is undesirable. Since the markup is also small he is only willing to sell for cash. Once again the buyer's action is determined by how he considers himself to be treated by the investor. An undervalued buyer is unwilling to pay cash since that would require rasing funds.
An overvalued buyer is willing pay cash if necessary, but will buy on credit if that is all that is available.
Finally when there is a modest amount of seller market power an undervalued seller will not offer trade credit. However, in contrast to the case with negligible market power, he is still keen to sell to the undervalued buyer. As a result the undervalued seller demands cash, but cuts the cash price. As before, the overvalued seller is willing to sell either for cash or for credit. An overvalued buyer pays cash and an undervalued buyer takes the trade credit.
The analysis generates many empirical implications. These are collected in Section (IV). Here we draw attention to four aspects of the analysis. First, existing theory does not easily account for firms with similar creditworthiness both offering credit to, and taking credit from each other.
For instance Biais and Gollier (1997) model a situation in which trade credit is used to mitigate credit rationing. If the firms are roughly equally rationed then trade credit is not expected. Yet we know empirically that trade credit is used between apparently equally creditworthy firms. Under the approach taken in this paper such behavior is to be expected.
Next, many practitioners and textbooks recommend that firms should collect their receivables rapidly, and stretch their payables. 3 In support of this recommendation, it is commonly pointed out that firms behaving in this manner seem to outperform apparently similar firms doing the reverse.
Or else it is pointed out, that firms make the recommended change at the same time as their profits improve. The assumption is that stretching payables and collecting receivables promptly causes high profitability. Therefore low profit firms can improve their profitability by changing their trade credit policy.
In fact this widely offered advice could actually damage corporate profits. In our theory different firms will choose different collection policies in a manner that reflects the opportunities that they face. Adopting a highly profitable strategy for a firm in a different situation would be damaging to a firm, not helpful. Undervalued firms will commonly extend less than an average amount of trade credit, take more than an average amount of trade credit, and charge lower than average prices. This reflects that fact that they are coping with the problem that the financial market is undervaluing them. Of course later on the previously undervalued firms will appear to have outperformed apparently similar firms who were not undervalued.
It has been observed (Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 2001 ) that when the prospects of a fast growing firm take a turn for the worse, sometime the managers respond by extending more credit to their customers. In our analysis this could be the correct profit maximizing action by the manager. When the firm's prospects take a turn for the worse, raising funds to finance more credit, now seems cheaper than before. Once the investor realizes the change in the firm's true prospects, the firm will cease being overvalued. At that point the surge in trade credit use will be cut back.
The theory also has implications for developing economies. Trade credit plays an important role in providing finance to many firms in developing countries. Fisman and Love (2003) show that in such countries, the firms that rely particularly on trade credit grow faster than do the firms without access to trade credit. These countries often have more opaque accounting practices and less efficient financial markets (Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) , Bhattacharya, Dauok, and Welker (2003) ). More broadly, lack of creditor protections and weak legal systems make external financing by financial intermediaries and markets difficult to obtain (LaPorta, Lopez-De-Sialanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Demirguc-Kunt and , and Rajan and Zingales (1998) ).
Our analysis suggests that in developing countries the provision of trade credit by suppliers may be an important channel by which firms can access capital indirectly, through their suppliers.
This may permit productive transactions to take place which might not have taken place if they had need to be financed directly. This type of intermediation can be efficient because it economizes on the total amount that the buyer and the seller need to raise from the inefficient financial market.
Our model predicts that this channel is particularly important in countries where suppliers have market power. This could be caused by government tariff policies or by small market size.
Increasing competition in the goods market caused by globalization will lead to a diminished role as financial intermediaries for suppliers.
The paper is organized as follows. The rest of the introduction discusses the related literature, and the applicable American legal context. In section (II) the loss of control experienced by the investor in relending is analyzed. In section (III) there is adverse selection in the assets of both the sellers and the buyers. Thus for some firms extending trade credit is cheap, while for others it seems expensive. We show how this affects the use of trade credit as well as the pricing of goods sold for cash. The main empirical implications of the analysis are collected in (IV). Section (V) concludes.
A. Related Literature
The literature on trade credit can be divided into papers that focus on the real operations and papers that focus on the financial aspects. Real operations motivations for trade credit include, transaction cost minimization, price discrimination, and quality guarantees. The existing theories show effects that may be important in specific circumstances, but they do not capture what seems to be central for explaining the wide spread use of trade credit and the empirical patterns of its use. This shows up in several ways. Partly it shows up in the specialized nature of the assumptions required in previous papers such as the credit rationing, quality guarantee, and price discrimination theories. In each case the suggested effects could happen. In each case the circumstances required are somewhat specialized. Partly it shows up in counterfactual empirical implications.
If trade credit existed to minimize transactions costs as in Ferris (1981) , then we should have observed a long term decline in trade credit use, due to the many improvements in transactions technologies that have taken place. Such a long term decline has not occurred. Hence there must be more to the use of trade credit. Another cost minimizing idea is that some firms may be better able to hold inventory. According to Emery (1987) trade credit may be used to induce them to hold it.
Price discrimination may be an important concern. According to Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner (1988) firms use credit to provide discriminatory price reductions to less wealthy customers. Their analysis is restricted to imperfectly competitive industries.
Trade credit may play a role when there is uncertainty about whether the seller is providing a high quality product. This idea has been studied by Lee and Stowe (1993) , Long, Malitz and Ravid (1993) , Emery and Nayar (1998) , and Deloof and Jegers (1996) . The idea is that until the buyer can verify the quality of the good, he does not pay. The delay in payment is implicitly a guarantee of the quality of the good. Such guarantees are likely to be of particular importance for smaller and less well established sellers.
An early financial approach to trade credit was to suggest that it reflects arbitrage. Emery (1984) argues that when the borrowing and lending rates that are available to firms differ, trade credit can serve to arbitrage the difference. A related idea is that trade credit may serve to mitigate credit rationing. According to Smith (1987) the seller learns the state of the buyer from the fact that it took the expensive trade credit. The seller then offers financial assistance to a troubled buyer in order to protect his investment in their long term relationship. In Cunat (2002) the supplier also has a stake in the survival of the buyer. Wilner (2000) develops a related idea. In his model a firm in financial distress renegotiates with the trade creditor. The analysis focuses on the relationship between the real interest rate and the implicit interest rate embedded in the trade credit contract.
When the real interest rate rises, the trade creditor becomes more reluctant to renegotiate.
According to Biais and Gollier (1997) the seller's provision of trade credit provides a valuable signal to the investor that a buyer is worthy of credit, and so the investor provides the buyer with more funding than he would otherwise have provided. Since essentially all firms both offer and receive trade credit, the credit rationing theories seem to suggest that all firms are credit rationed, which is not usually claimed. Or else they must leave to some other theory, the observation by Petersen and Rajan (1997) , that large firms both offer and receive more trade credit than do small firms. Petersen and Rajan (1997) is an important study of the empirical patterns of trade credit use. We pay particular attention to how their findings relate to our analysis. Ng, Smith, and Smith (1999) provide valuable survey evidence on the cross-sectional differences in the terms of trade credit.
They find that buyer and seller reputation ("creditworthiness" in our terms) is important as are the proxy variables for adverse selection. In contrast to Wilner (2000) , Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) argue that trade credit terms tend not to adjust when interest rates change. Particularly helpful reviews of the institutional environment are provided by Cole (1992) , Parkinson and Kallberg as the use of captive finance companies. Smith and Schnucker (1994) study the factoring decision.
It should be noted that the idea that multiple borrowing channels can have important effects on the market equilibrium is not new to our paper. For instance Rajan and Winton (1995) study how externalities across borrowing channels lead banks to structure their lending contracts to borrowers in ways that would not be needed if there were a single lending chanel.
B. Legal Context
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Legal scholars such as Garvin (1996) who have studied trade credit focus a great deal of their attention on the seller's right of repossession in a default. The value of a seller's claim depends in part, on his rights in the event that the buyer defaults. These rights fall into two categories. First, the rights that the seller has with respect to the buyer. Second, the rights that the seller has with respect to third parties who may also have claims to the buyer's assets. These third parties may include banks which have made loans to the buyer, the buyer's customers who have purchased the good, and if the buyer becomes bankrupt, the trustee in bankruptcy.
In the United States trade credit was originally a matter handled by Common Law. Since 1951 it has been covered by the often amended, Uniform Commercial Code (henceforth UCC) except in Louisiana.
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In principle the seller has the right to reclaim the good delivered on credit to an insolvent buyer. 6 This right is general for ten days, and stronger if within the last three months, the buyer 4 For those interested in more detail than we provide, see Hanson and Schenkel (1995) and Garvin (1996) . 5 Louisiana has a legal system that is based in civil law, and they have not adopted the UCC. In Louisiana the manufacturer reclaiming his good, has priority. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2003) show that in civil law countries firms tend to use more trade credit than do otherwise similar firms in common law countries.
6 "[Para. 2702] Sec. 2-702. Seller's Remedies on Discovery of Buyer's Insolvency (1) Where the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent he may refuse delivery except for cash including payment for all goods theretofore delivered under the contract, and stop delivery under this Article (Section 2-705).
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply. Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay.
(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser under this Article (Section 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to them." UCC Rep Serv, Code @ 2-702.
has misrepresented his solvency in writing. In order to reclaim the good, it must still exist. For example, once cattle has been cut into steaks or coal has been converted into coke, then they cannot be reclaimed by the seller.
Once the good is reclaimed, the original seller will normally sell the repossessed good. If, as is usually the case, this secondary sale is for less than the seller is owed, then the balance of the amount owing goes into the pool of unsecured claims against the bankrupt buyer. Such unsecured claims are usually lucky to get even a few pennies on the dollar. If, adjusting for costs of carrying out the resale, the secondary sale is for more that then amount owed, then surplus goes towards the other claims again the bankrupt firm. If the reclaiming seller chooses to keep the repossessed good, then there may be subsequent legal disputes over the fair market value of the good.
There may also be other claimants to the good. The good cannot be reclaimed from a customer who purchased it in good faith from the buyer. The courts have interpreted "purchased" rather broadly, to include cases in which a buyer has granted a floating lien to his banker or other suppliers of funds. A floating lien is a secured interest in after-acquired property. Floating liens are quite a common device.
To get priority above a floating lien, the UCC allows the seller needs to register what is known as a "purchase money security interest" (henceforth a PMSI). A PMSI is essentially similar to registering a mortgage against a particular good. A properly registered PMSI grants the seller the top priority.
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The UCC does not make it equally easy to register such a claim for all categories of goods. For equipment, under UCC section 9-312(4) (of the 1995 version), as long as the PMSI is recorded within ten days, then the seller of the equipment has priority over the floating lien. In 42 states, 20 days are permitted for registration. Goods that will form part of buyer inventory can also be covered by a PMSI according to UCC 9-312(3)b. In this case in order for the seller to have priority 7 As explained in a legal textbook: "A PMSI [Purchase Money Security Interest] provides protection for the seller in the following situation, although a perfected security interest already exists in the collateral: First State Bank advances funds to Jones Manufacturing and perfects a security interest in all the firm's equipment. The security agreement contains a provision extending the bank's interest to any after-acquired equipment. At a later date Jones purchases a new machine on credit from Smith Machine Company. As long as Smith Machine files a financing statement within ten days of the machine's delivery, its security interest has priority over that of First State Bank." Dunfee, Gibson, Blackburn, Whitman, McCarty and Brennan (1984) Hanson and Schenkel (1995) provide a synopsis of the UCC, intended to help credit managers.
They stress the importance of setting up office procedures to ensure that these statements are routinely filed without mistakes. Such registration costs any where from $3 to $25 depending on the state. The review by Garvin (1996) provides much more detail about the legal structures than we have provided, as well as giving references to relevant legal cases.
The central point for the theory is that, by registering a PMSI the seller can have top priority to reclaiming a good sold on trade credit. The law makes it easier to protect that right for equipment than for goods sold for inventory. In practice it is often the case that neither sellers nor banks avail themselves of the full rights that can be defined under the law. Most of time this does not matter much. However many legal cases stem from these situations and, in practice sellers often seem to wind up with the physical goods. Is this legal structure important empirically? Preve (2003) has studied the role of the UCC and finds that his "results are consistent with the legal protection given to trade creditors by the U.S. Unified Commercial Code."
II. The Relending Problem
A firm that normally sells a particular good is better positioned than is an investor to get full value from that good, if it is repossessed from a defaulting buyer. However if the investor funds the transaction indirectly by offering financing to the seller rather than to the buyer, the investor does not directly observe the financial worthiness of the buying firms that are being offered trade credit. This section derives an equilibrium that shows how these effects interact.
There is a seller, a buyer, and a perfectly competitive investor. All parties are risk neutral and the time value of money is zero. As a result the investor prices all securities at their expected payoff.
The seller has monopoly power and one unit of the good to sell. The seller is solvent with probability s, where 0 < s < 1.
There are two kinds of buyers, a high type that will be solvent with probability b h , and a low type who is solvent with probability b l , where 0 < b l < b h < 1. The high and low buyer types are equally likely. The solvency of the buyer is independent of the terms of this deal. It is assumed that the production costs are sufficiently low relative to the value of a sale, that it production is always profitable. The value of the good to a solvent buyer is normalized to be 1.
If the buyer defaults on a trade credit financed deal, then the seller can repossess the good, and realize a value of δ, where 0 < δ < 1. The investor is less well positioned to obtain value from a repossessed good. For algebraic simplicity it is assumed that in a repossession, the investor gets zero. We assume that from the perspective of the investor the transaction is secured. Thus if the seller defaults and the buyer does not default, then a loan from the investor to the seller gets repaid by the buyer.
Date t 0 :
The seller observes the buyer's type and decides the price and terms to offer to the buyer.
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Date t 1 : The buyer observes the price and terms offered. He either accepts these terms or else he rejects them. If he accepts the offer then one or both of the firms will ask the investor for funding.
Date t 2 :
The investor accepts all funding requests that at least allow the investor to break even.
Other requests are rejected. How much will a buyer be willing to promise to pay? If he is solvent then he just breaks even if he promises to pay $1. If he is insolvent, then he will not regret any promises since his payoff is zero. Accordingly both types of buyer will promise to pay $1, to whoever finances the deal.
That can be a promise to the investor, or a promise to the seller on trade credit. The buyer will never promise more than $1 since that could only pay if some of the value is coming from being overvalued by the investor. However the investor knows the type of any firm that is being directly funded.
If the investor lends to a buyer, then the investor observes the buyer's type. In exchange for the promised repayment of a dollar, a high type buyer will receive a bank loan of L bh = b h . A low type buyer will receive a loan of L bl = b l . If the buyers are borrowing directly from the investor to fund the transaction, then the goods market sale is a cash sale.
If the investor lends to the seller, then the seller extends credit to the buyer. The investor observes the creditworthiness of the seller, but does not observe the creditworthiness of the buyer.
How much the investor will lend to the seller depends on the investor's belief about the credit policy of the seller. If the investor thinks that the seller is lending to a low type buyer, then the investor will lend
if the investor thinks that the seller is extending trade credit to a high type buyer. If the investor thinks that it is equally likely that the seller is funding either type of buyer, then the investor will
These expressions are simple to interpret. For example consider the case in which the investor thinks that the trade credit is being extended to a low type buyer. If the seller is solvent the investor will get the dollar repayment, and the probability of that is s. If the seller is insolvent then there is still a chance of repayment in the event that the buyer is solvent. If the seller defaults, but the buyer does not, then the lender is still repaid. The chance of this is (1 − s)b l .
Since the seller has the bargaining power, any money loaned by the investor to a buyer will be demanded as the sale price when the good is being sold for cash. The seller's payoff when selling to a type i buyer for cash is
When selling on trade credit the seller's payoff is denoted π ij where i is the actual buyer type which may be high(h) or low (l). The buyer type expected by the investor is denoted as j, and it may be high (h), low (l), or pooled (p). The seller's expected payoff is
Initially the seller gets L sj from the investor, and spends c on production. If the seller is insolvent, the remaining payoff is just zero. The probability that the seller is solvent is s. When solvent, the seller gets paid one dollar if the buyer is solvent which happens with probability b i . If the buyer is insolvent the seller repossesses the good and claims δ. The seller must also repay the bank one dollar.
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A. How Much Trade Credit Will Be Used?
Trade credit has a clear advantage if repossession proves necessary. Accordingly, the central issue is how close the seller can get to an equilibrium in which all trade is on credit. Not all trade can be on credit because the investor cannot observe the quality of the buyer. We call this the "relending problem." There is thus a tension between the efficiency of trade credit against the asymmetric information problem that trade credit creates. The equilibrium reflects this tension.
Due to the relending problem, in the equilibrium the investor restricts the loan to the seller.
To cope with this limited amount of funding, the seller cuts back on the amount of trade credit to extend. Where does the cut back take place? It is cut back where it does the least damage.
Restricting trade credit does less damage to the high type buyer because the high type can get better terms directly from the investor than can the low type buyer.
One possibility is thus to offer credit to the low type buyer and not credit to the high type buyer.
But this has the defect that even high type buyers might default which then puts the repossessed good in the hands of the investor. To minimize this defect there is an equilibrium in which the seller provides trade credit to both types of buyers, but on somewhat different terms. These terms induce to the high type buyer to do some direct borrowing from the investor while the low type buyer does not do direct borrowing. One way to think about this result is that the high type buyer pays on time while the low type buyer is allowed to "stretch the payables." The stretching of payables by low type buyers is a common topic of discussion in the applied credit literature. The relending problem analysis provides an explanation for why sellers permit such behavior. Another way to interpret this is to think of the low type buyer as a financially distressed firm. Preve (2003) shows empirically that financially distressed firms take more trade credit from their suppliers. He explicitly interprets his findings as supporting our analysis.
An important aspect of this equilibrium is that it accounts for firms extending some trade credit to other equally creditworthy firms. Most public companies have both accounts receivable and accounts payable, so some explanation is needed. Neither the arbitrage approach of Emery (1984) , nor the credit rationing approach of Smith (1987) , and Biais and Gollier (1997) , lead one to expect to see such things. For example Biais and Gollier (1997) assert that, "firms which do not suffer from credit rationing do not use trade credit ...".
The results of comparative static calculations are easily described in words. First, as the low type buyer becomes more creditworthy, the seller increases the proportion of trade credit provided to the high type buyer. Thus the creditworthiness of the low type buyer has a spillover effect on the amount of trade credit being offered to the high type buyer. This is an effect of the seller attempting to cope with having limited financial resources. Second, as the high type buyer becomes increasingly creditworthy, the seller reduces the fraction of trade credit provided. This occurs because the improved creditworthiness of the high type buyer increases the amount that they can raise directly from the investor. The more creditworthy the seller, the more trade credit is provided to the high type buyer. Finally, as the value that can be reclaimed in a repossession rises, a greater fraction of the sale to the high type buyer is financed by trade credit. This is simply because the advantage of the seller over the investor becomes more important.
Two comments on policy follows naturally from the equilibrium. The right of a seller to reclaim is a function of the law. As documented in Garvin (1996) 
III. Trade Credit and Long Term Financial Problems
Following Myers and Majluf (1984) a substantial literature has developed showing the importance of adverse selection in understanding corporate financing practices. Corporate insiders often have an advantage over outsiders in assessing the value of the assets in place. Knowing this, the investor takes steps to protect his position. We have abstracted from these empirically important issues so far, in order to isolate the importance of relending. However this type of adverse selection interacts in significant ways with trade credit.
This section of the paper analyzes the the interaction between trade credit and adverse selection in long term finance. We will show that trade credit, by offering an additional channel through which things can be learned, sometimes permits firms to completely get around the damaging effects of adverse selection. 12 More commonly the damaging effects of adverse selection cannot be fully avoided. Trade credit serves to channel the effects of adverse selection problems in a manner that implies that financing and real activities are not separable.
The model is similar to that in the relending problem. The most important difference is that the outside funding provided to the firms takes the form of equity. 13 The fact that outside funding takes the form of equity has two important implications. First, it implies that funding represents a claim not just on the good being traded, but also on the other assets of the firm. As in Myers and Majluf (1984) , we suppose that the manager is better able to assess the true worth of the corporate assets than can the outside investor. So this creates a familiar adverse selection problem. Second, equity makes the analysis algebraically simpler because there is no risk of default.
As before there are three players: the seller, the buyer and the investor. The buyer and the seller can each be either of two types. The seller has assets in place which may turn out to be valuable, or which may turn out to be worthless. If things turn out well, then the seller's assets in place are
For the high type seller the assets have positive value with probability s h . For a low type seller the assets in place have positive value with probability s l . By definition 0 < s l < s h < 1. If the seller has a bad draw, the value of the assets is zero. The seller is the only one who knows his type.
The seller is a priori equally likely to be either high or low type.
The buyer also has assets in place which may be valuable, or which may be worthless. If valuable, the buyer's assets are worth A b > 0. For the high type buyer these have positive value with probability b h . For a low type seller the assets in place have positive value with probability b l .
If the buyer has a bad draw the value of the assets is zero. Only the buyer knows the buyer's type. A priori the buyer is equally likely to be high type, or to be low type. The buyer type is independent of the seller's type.
12 More precisely, when adverse selection affects only the buyer or only the seller, there is an equilibrium in which the other side of the market raises the necessary funding to complete the transaction. That equilibrium is Pareto efficient and maximizes the payoff to the seller. 13 In an earlier draft of the paper it was shown that essentially the same equilibria arise in the case of debt financing, when debt financing leave the adverse selection effects in place. While that analysis allows us to bring in property rights explicitly, it does not offer qualitative insights about adverse selection beyond those present in the case of equity. Thus we restrict attention to the algebraically much simpler case of equity. We follow Myers and Majluf (1984) in assuming that firms maximize the value of their existing equity.
As before, the seller will require c in order to produce, where 0 < c < 1 is paid before production takes place. When the buyer takes possession of the produced good it is converted into $1 dollar for sure. If a transaction takes place so that the buyer takes possession of the good it is converted into $1 dollar for sure. Thus, if the buyer and seller can finance the transaction, they stand to realize a surplus of $1 − c.
Financing is provided by the investor. By assumption all financing is equity. The investor is assumed to be perfectly competitive, and so will demand enough equity to just cover any funds extended. The investor cannot observe the type of either the buyer or the seller. The investor sees both the invoice for the sale and the amount demanded by a firm trying to raise cash.
If the sale is to be on trade credit then the seller must raise c by giving up an equity stake to the investor. If the sale is for cash then the seller does not need to approach the investor. However, the buyer must raise $1 by giving up an equity stake to the investor. Notice that if the seller has a markup over production costs so that$1 > c, then a transaction financed by trade credit requires less outside funding than does a cash sale.
As in the relending problem, all parties are risk neutral and the time value of money is zero.
Date t 0 : A seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to sell without observing the buyer's type. At the seller's discretion, the offer may require payment in cash, or it may include trade credit terms.
Date t 1 : Observing the seller's offer, the buyer chooses a strategy. The buyer may decide to take an available offer, or the buyer may decide against buying.
Date t 2 :
If an offer by the seller has been accepted then either the seller or the buyer will go the investor to raise the funds necessary to complete the transaction. The investor funds all requests that at least allow him to expect to break even.
Date t 3 :
The loan is made, and production takes place.
Date t 4 : All uncertainty is resolved and payoffs are made.
A strategy for a seller consists of posting a pair of prices (p c , p k ), where p c is a cash price and p k is a credit price. If a seller chooses not to offer trade credit, then we replace p k = ∅. Similarly it is possible to set p c = ∅. These can the thought of as either not posting a price, or else as posting any price greater than one. If the seller wishes to trade on a particular set of terms, then the entry will be a number between zero and one.
Next consider the possible strategies for the buyer. When the buyer takes possession of the good it is converted into $1 dollar for sure. The buyer also has assets in place which may be valuable, or which may be worthless. If valuable, the buyer's assets are worth A b > 0. For the high type buyer these have positive value with probability b h . For a low type seller the assets in place have positive value with probability b l . By definition 0 < b l < b h < 1. If the buyer has a bad draw the value of the assets is zero. Only the buyer knows the buyer's type. A priori the buyer is equally likely to be high type, or to be low type. The buyer type is independent of the seller's type.
The buyer observes the seller's offer (p c , p k ) and makes a decision to take one offer, the other offer, or neither. An important element in the buyer's strategy are his reservation prices (p c , p k ) which are the maximum that he is willing to pay for cash if only a cash price is quoted (p c ), and the maximum he will pay on credit if it alone is offered (p k ).
Finally consider the investor. By assumption all financing is equity. The investor is assumed to be perfectly competitive, and so will demand enough equity to just cover any funds extended. The investor cannot observe the type of either the buyer or the seller. The investor sees both the invoice for the sale and the amount demanded by a firm trying to raise cash.
Let f (i, m, k) denote the fraction of firm i's equity demanded by the investor, where m is the investor's expectation of firm type and k is the amount of funding to be provided. The firm's role as a seller or a buyer is denoted i and so i = b, s. The investor's expectation regarding the firm's type denoted m will be one of high (h), low (l), or pooled (p). For example suppose that the seller needs to obtain c dollars, he will charge a price of k on trade credit, and is thought to be pooled,
If the investor is funding a seller, the production cost c is also the level of funding required for trade credit to be feasible. If the investor is funding a buyer, then the funding pays for a cash transaction. Notice that if the seller has a markup over production costs, then trade credit feasibility requires less outside funding than does a cash sale.
The value of a firm is denoted v(i, j, t) where j is the actual firm type, and t is the sales revenue.
Again i shows whether the firm is a seller or a buyer, i = b, s. The firm's actual type may be either high (h), or low (l). For instance, if a low type firm sells the good for a cash price of t then,
If for example the low type seller does not sell, then sales revenue is zero and so, v(s, l, 0) = s l A s .
The payoff to a seller is denoted as π s (actual type, investor expectation of firm type, cash price, credit price). For instance, a high type seller, expected to be low, who quotes a cash price of $1, and refuses to sell on credit is π s (h, l, 1, ∅). The payoff to a seller has the following form, 
A. The Constraints
Any suggested equilibrium must satisfy two categories of constraints. First, each firm must satisfy a participation constraint. Second, each firm must find it's suggested strategy incentive compatible. Thus in a pooling equilibrium none of the firms must prefer to separate, and in a separating equilibrium neither firm must prefer to mimic the other type. In general the only nontrivial participation constraints are those subject to potential adverse selection, i.e. the high type seller selling on credit, and the high type buyer paying cash. In this section we point out some general restrictions that follow from the constraints.
A.1. Buyers
The maximum that the buyer is willing to pay for cash, if only cash terms are offered, is denoted p c . The maximum that the buyer is willing to pay on trade credit, if only credit terms are offered, is denoted p k . We are interested in characterizing these.
The first observation is that no buyer will pay more than $1. Both the high and the low type of buyer are able to convert the good into $1 for sure. The only way that a buyer would agree to pay more than $1 would be if he could get extra surplus from the investor. When paying on trade credit, he does not borrow from the investor directly, and so we know that p k ≤ 1. At p k = 1, the buyer just breaks even, and so is just willing to participate. The fact that seller has market power means that, p k = 1 which simplifies the analysis.
If buying for cash, the buyer does borrow directly from the investor. But a willingness to pay the seller more than $1 would reveal the fact that the firm was being overvalued, and so is of low type. Because of the time sequencing, the investor observes the price that the buyer is agreeing to pay to the seller. Accordingly it will never be profitable for the buyer to agree to pay more than $1.
What is the maximum cash price that the high type buyer will accept if trade credit is not available? This depends on the financing available to the high type buyer. For example, suppose that the investor treats buyers as of pooled type, and so demands a fraction of equity given by
The high type buyer is indifferent between paying cash, and not buying if,
Substitute for f (b, p, 1) and solve for p c ; then denote the solution as p. Thus,
If a seller does not offer trade credit, but offers to sell for p, then both buyer types will accept.
Under what condition will the buyer prefer a purchase for cash? His gain from a purchase on credit is 1− p k . His gain from a purchase for cash over credit is going to be
There is a condition like this for the high type firm and another for the low type firm.
A.2. Sellers
Sellers require at least c in order for production to be feasible. The seller would like to get the price as close to 1 as is possible, since that price extracts all the available surplus. If the seller is selling for cash, then we know that c ≤ p c ≤ 1. If the seller is selling on trade credit, then there is a further issue of the adverse selection by the investor to deal with. Since this only poses a problem for the high type seller, in each proof we need to check the high type seller's participation constraint. We know that the low type seller's constraint will be satisfied trivially. For the high type seller to be willing to sell on trade credit if being pooled we need,
The second issue is whether the seller will extend trade credit. If he sells for cash the profit is, p c − c. If he sells on trade credit, his profit is
There are separate conditions such that cash is preferred to offering trade credit; one for the high type seller, and the other for the low type seller. They will both take the form of,
B. Production Costs and Market Equilibria
In this section we characterize the equilibria that can arise. First we explain why there cannot be an all cash equilibrium, an all trade credit equilibrium. Then we show how the character of the equilibrium depends on the difference between the amount that the buyer pays and the cost of production. It also depends on the seller's choice of credit policy.
A key idea is that when raising outside funds the buyer and the seller both need to cover the production costs, but only the buyer would need to cover the seller's profit. If there are adverse selection problems in dealings with outside investors, then this will be more costly. In equilibrium firms will try to minimize this extra cost.
The potential for choosing trade credit policies that minimize adverse selection costs depends on the difference between the seller's cost and the amount that the buyer's willingness to pay. In a more general setting this in turn may be determined by the seller's market power. The seller's trade credit policy can influence which buyers must go to the financial market to raise funds. This in turn can affect whether there is a pooling or a separating financial market equilibrium for the buyers.
Suppose that there were to be an equilibrium in which all trade was for cash. The low type seller faces no adverse selection from the investor. Accordingly it would pay the low type seller to deviate by selling equity to the investor, and extending trade credit to at least some buyers. If all buyers were paying cash then the investor must have been treating them as pooled. In that case the high type buyer is being overcharged. He would take the trade credit.
Suppose there were to be an equilibrium in which all trade was on trade credit. In this case the sellers are being pooled by the investor. This is disadvantageous to the high type seller. If the high type seller deviates by offering a very slight price cut for a cash sale, the low type buyers will take it, breaking the equilibrium.
It is natural to ask whether an equilibrium matching that from the relending analysis can be found. Since the low type firm will always want to mimic, such an equilibrium would have to involve sellers pooling. However that cannot work. As will be shown below, the payoffs are linear in c. Accordingly the solution will generally be at a corner involving either no trade credit, or complete funding of the transaction by trade credit.
Since there will be neither an all cash equilibrium, nor an all trade credit equilibrium, the issue is how much of each will be used by whom. The amount of surplus potentially available is central to the nature of the results. Since we normalize the value of the good in the buyer's hands as 1, the amount of potentially available surplus is 1 − c.
First suppose that the seller has a great deal of market power. Then if the buyer pays cash he must borrow enough from the investor in order to cover both the production cost and a large seller markup. If instead the sale is on trade credit then the seller only needs to borrow enough to cover the production costs. If the seller has a lot of market power this difference in the amount that needs to be borrowed will be big. Since both the seller and the buyer face adverse selection when dealing with the investor, trade credit will tend to be favored. A formal statement of this idea and a proof can be found in the appendix. This idea can be phrased as follows.
Proposition 2 If the buyer's valuation of the good is high relative to the seller's cost of production, then the seller always posts a credit price of 1 and offers a slight discount for cash payments. The buyers who are overvalued by the market pay cash and they buyers who are undervalued by the market buy on credit.
Second, we consider an intermediate level of seller market power. Relative to the first case the gap between seller production costs and the value of the good to the buyer is smaller. There is a balancing of forces between the financing problems of the buyers and of the sellers.
In order to induce the undervalued buyers to raise funds, the undervalued seller offers to sell for a low cash price. The overvalued seller will offer trade credit and sells at a higher price.
Consider the high type of seller. He is undervalued by the financial market and so he would like to avoid the use of the financial market. On the other hand he still has market power and does not want to lose sales. So he cuts the price of the good in order to keep all buyers buying.
Consider the low type of seller. Since the high type is not using the financial market the investor knows that he is financing a low type seller. Thus for the low type of seller the financing is on fair terms. Accordingly the low type seller does not care whether he raises funds or not, he simply want to make as much as possible on the sale. Thus the low type of seller demands a price of $1 and will sell for cash and will offer trade credit if the buyer wants.
Now consider the problem from the buyer's point of view. If facing a high type seller the only choice is to raise funds and pay cash, or not to buy. In the appendix we provide the condition under which all buyers buy. Now suppose the buyer is facing a low type seller. Both cash and credit are available at a price of $1. Thus the potentially overvalued buyer is willing to raise funds while the potentially undervalued buyer is unwilling to do so. The high type (undervalued) buyer thus buys on credit.
The low type buyer is indifferent between paying cash and buying on credit.
A formal statement of these ideas and a proof can be found in the appendix. This idea can be phrased as follows. The above proposition has an interesting driving force. 14 At the start of this section we suggested that in general we might often expect to see the seller raise funds since he does not have to raise the profit margin. In the current range of parameters the high type buyer is actually the one to raise funds. This happens because the seller can in essence favorably alter the financial market equilibrium treatment of the buyers. By offering only cash terms, all buyers who wish to buy must raise funds. By setting a cash price that is attractive to all buyers this causes the financial market to pool all buyers. As a result the high type buyer gets funds at a pooled rate.
Suppose instead that the high type seller deviated and went to the market to raise funds himself.
He would be perceived as of being low type and be punished more severely. If the markup is in this intermediate range, it is better for the high type seller to get the high type buyer to raise funds as part of a pooled equilibrium, than for the seller to raise funds and be treated as a low type seller.
Third, we consider the other extreme in which the seller does not have much market power.
Now the costs and benefits of treatment in the financial market are key since the markup on the good is low. The value of the transaction to a high type seller and the high type buyer is insufficient to compensate them for the loss they incur if they raise capital from the investor.
The high type seller demands the full dollar to be paid in cash. Trade credit is not offered due to the poor treatment by the investor. The low type buyer is willing to pay cash, the high type buyer is not. Thus when a high type seller faces a high type buyer, in this case to trade takes place.
The low type seller also demands the full dollar, but will accept either cash or trade credit. He is willing to offer trade credit since the investor recognizes that he is the low type and treats the firm accordingly. Once again the low type buyer is willing to pay cash, while the high type buyer is not. So the high type buyer take the trade credit. The low type buyer is equally happy paying cash or buying on trade credit.
The intuition for this range of parameters is similar to the underinvestment equilibrium in Myers and Majluf (1984) . Once again a formal statement and proof can be found in the appendix.
We can summarize the idea as follows. What overall messages are suggested in this section? If the seller's cost of production is low enough, then all sellers are prepared to sell either for cash or on credit terms since the undervaluation of the assets is not such a problem. The amount that is needed is modest. The high type buyer, worrying about the problem of undervaluation of his assets by the investor, buys on credit terms to avoid having to raise additional outside funds. The low type buyer is not worried about undervaluation of his assets by the investor, and so he is willing to pay cash.
If the seller's cost of production is high enough then the high type seller's worry about the undervaluation of his assets by the investor becomes a first order concern. So he only offers to sell for cash. The low type seller does not have to worry about the undervaluation of his other assets, and so he is willing to sell either for cash or on credit terms. Either way he will demand $1 to extract all surplus. The high type buyer is willing to buy on credit, but not for cash. The low type buyer is willing to buy either for cash or for credit.
At moderate cost levels, it matters exactly how the various parameters of the problem relate to each other. The low type seller is willing to sell for either cash or for credit, as long as he gets all the surplus. The high type seller is willing to sell for cash. He charges a lower cash price than does the low type seller. This is because he is not willing to sell for credit, but he still would like to attract both the overvalued and the undervalued buyers to buy from him. There is thus a moderating effect on the price of the intermediate good in this case. The loss in market power is at the expense of the high type seller. The gain is received by all buyers.
Consider how these equilibria are related. It is easy to show that the equilibria in propositions (2) and (3) are overlapping. However the equilibria in propositions (3) and (4) do not overlap. Cadsby, Frank and Maksimovic (1998) find that when there are multiple equilibria, efficiency is sometimes helpful in predicting which equilibrium will be observed. For the current theory it seems likely that efficiency from the perspective of the seller may be crucial. If so, then we expect that the equilibrium in proposition (2) dominates that in proposition (3) when the parameter values are such that both exist.
15
How does the relative importance of the adverse selection on either side of the market affect the predictions?
Corollary 1 Part i) Suppose that adverse selection is very bad for the buyers (b l and b h are very far apart), but a minor matter for the sellers (s l and s h are very close together). The equilibrium in proposition (2) is the one that is likely to arise. Part ii) Suppose that adverse selection is not much of a problem for the buyers (b l and b h are very close together), but it is a serious problem for the sellers (s l and s h are very far apart). Then the (3) equilibrium is the one that is likely to arise.
There is an asymmetry created by the seller's markup. Less outside funding is needed if the sale is on trade credit rather than for cash. Only the production cost c, needs to be covered by the outside funding. Outside funding of a cash sale must also cover the seller's markup. This tends to favor the use of trade credit, and therefore to work against the (3 ) equilibrium. To see this, suppose that s l = b l , s h = b h , and that A s = A b . Then by condition (22) the (3) equilibrium cannot exist.
The literature contains many models of security issuance in which the low type in a pool benefits at the expense of the high type (see Daniel and Titman (1995) for a survey). Our model differs because benefits that a low type buyer would otherwise realize, can be partly removed through the product market relationship. They are removed if the seller finds it profitable to offer trade credit.
Trade credit removes the incentive for the high type buyer to pool with the low type buyer. Thus trade credit reduces the importance of adverse selection by allowing external financing by the party with least adverse selection. The party which benefits from adverse selection is not necessarily the 15 In any equilibrium under uncertainty, we must take care to specify the beliefs of the firms. As is well known, the equilibrium can be sensitive to the specification of the beliefs held about events that are not observed in the equilibrium. An alternative to the beliefs that we specify, would be to specify that the investor treats deviating firms as low type. That would change the range of parameter values for which the equilibria we derive hold. It does not otherwise change their character. lower type. In order to benefit from adverse selection, you have to be the low type doing business with firms that have a worse adverse selection problem than your side of the market has.
IV. Empirical Implications
In this section we highlight some of the testable implications of the analysis. We certainly do not think that our theory is the only explanation for all types of trade credit. However, we do think that our approach can help to account for a range of behaviors that are commonly observed. In this section we point out some of these implications.
The relending and the adverse selection problems will in general coexist. Many of the implications are similar, but there are cases in which they have differing implications. Such cases can be used to assess the relative importance of these two aspects of trade credit. Since Petersen and Rajan (1997) is a particularly comprehensive empirical study of trade credit and we put particular emphasis on how our predictions relate to their findings. Recently Preve (2003) has tested the theory developed in our paper and finds support for our predictions.
The relending problem shows how the use of trade credit varies, as a function of observed creditworthiness. Thus tests can be based on ex ante observable differences between firms. Unlike the relending problem, the adverse selection problem is fundamentally based on the idea that observationally equivalent firms are actually positioned quite differently. This implies that empirical tests of the adverse selection problems cannot be based on ex ante observable features of the firm.
Tests of the adverse selection can be based on differences between industries. Looking between industries, it should be possible to distinguish those industries in which adverse selection is a particular problem, using measures like product heterogeneity, high research and development, the profitability of insider trades, or high advertising expenses. Tests can also be based on the use of ex post realizations to infer those who were ex ante incorrectly valued. This can be done by looking at firms that experienced significant increases or drops in the values of their shares.
Many of the existing theories of trade credit, do not directly account for the fact that it is short term credit. The analysis of the relending problem predicts that trade credit is usually short term credit. Inputs provide collateral supporting trade credit. Finished goods do not. As discussed in section (B) once a good is processed or resold in good faith, then as a matter of law the collateral value is gone. Nothing can legally be repossessed by the seller. The investor concern about the relending policy of the seller would no longer be offset by the greater ability to reclaim value in a repossession. Accordingly at that point, direct financing of the buyer would dominate over a continued extension of trade credit.
A number of testable implications follow directly. First, the seller has no advantage over the investor in the collection of cash, and so the extent to which a firm receives trade credit will be independent of it's cash holdings. This independence is consistent with the findings of Petersen and Rajan (1997) . Second, the analysis predicts that the accounts payable and the inventory holdings should be positively related. Fisman and Love (2003) tested this hypothesis and found it to be supported. Third, it accounts for the empirical finding by Petersen and Rajan (1997) , that trade credit received by a firm is negatively related to the percentage of inventory that consists of finished goods. Fourth, it implies that industries with longer inventory holding periods will have longer trade credit periods.
16 Fifth, if a firm adopts "just in time" inventory policies, then the terms of trade credit that it receives will be shortened. This implication remains to be tested.
The analysis of the relending problem predicts that sellers provide a great deal of trade credit to low type buyers, and the amount of credit that they provide to high type buyers is an increasing function of the seller's creditworthiness. Thus empirically we expect to see firms both extending and receiving trade credit in transactions with firms of similar creditworthiness. This contrasts with the predictions of theories stressing the price discrimination role of trade credit, or its role in helping a financially troubled buyer. We also expect to see that more creditworthy firms extend more trade credit overall, as is documented in Petersen and Rajan (1997) .
The advantage in repossession is likely to be more important for industries with imperfectly competitive second hand goods markets. Holding the physical perishability of the good constant, the presence of a highly efficient second hand goods market will reduce the advantage that the seller has over the investor. Hence the investor will finance the buyer who will then pay cash more often in such industries.
The legal ability of creditors to repossess collateral in a bankruptcy will affect the relative use of trade credit. This suggests two types of tests. First, within the US there have been legal changes that marginally reduced the ability of sellers to reclaim goods. This is not predicted to affect all firms equally. Such changes should have been followed by an increased use of cash sales, particularly by the more creditworthy buyer.
Second, across countries there are different legal systems. Some systems are more favorable to seller repossession than are other legal systems. This could also be used to construct a direct test of the theory. It is well known that some in some countries trade credit is more important than in others, but we have not seen a test of how this matches with their legal systems.
If the outside observer can distinguish industries with insignificant asymmetric information from those severely affected, then adverse selection has directly testable implications. In those industries in which asymmetries of information about the values of the sellers assets in place are present but small, all sellers will offer to sell for both cash and credit, the differences in the terms offered by different sellers will be small, and differences in the cash and credit prices charged by an individual seller will also be small. At the other extreme, in those industries in which there are large potential asymmetries among both the buyers and the sellers, some (undervalued) sellers will only sell for cash, whereas other (overvalued) sellers sell for both cash and credit. However, observed cash and credit prices will again be similar, although the availability of credit differs.
For those industries in which both sellers and buyers face significant, but not overwhelming adverse selection when dealing with the investors, there is a moderating effect. Undervalued sellers demand cash and do not offer credit terms, whereas other sellers sell offer both cash and credit terms. In particular the cash price demanded by the undervalued sellers is predicted to be lower than the cash price demanded by the overvalued sellers. This difference is predicted to be greater than the difference between the cash and credit prices offered by the overvalued sellers.
By offering trade credit the seller may be able to increase the price he charges. 17 Overvalued firms will tend to be extending a greater than average amount of trade credit. They will be taking less than an average amount of trade credit. Undervalued firms will tend to be doing the reverse. Petersen and Rajan (1997) find greater extension of trade credit by firms with negative income, and negative sales growth. As they point out, this does not follow from the previous theories of trade credit. It is consistent with the adverse selection approach. Suppose that a firm has been undervalued, and changes to being overvalued. This pattern is particularly likely for high growth firms that reach a turning point in their opportunities. 18 It is likely that insiders recognize the change before the investor. Such a firm will increase sales on trade credit, and reduce the amount of trade credit that it takes from its own suppliers.
It is popular to relate credit practices to profitability, and interpret the causality as running from credit policy to profits. There is an institutional literature which does precisely this, and then recommends demanding early payment from buyers while stretching a firm's own payables (see Masonson (1990) for instance). Similar advice can be found in many finance textbooks. The analysis suggests that greater caution is needed.
Suppose that an analyst looked at a sample of initially seemingly identical firms, some of whom turned out to be more successful than others. Suppose that the effects found in our analysis of adverse selection are at work. Then the more successful firms will have extended less trade credit, taken more trade credit, and on average charged lower prices. In contrast to the causal interpretation given to such correlations in the institutional literature, in our model these factors are reflective of undervaluation, rather than causal of success.
Our interpretation can be tested using ex post analysis of firms that had significant stock market declines. Prior to such declines, we would predict an increases in sales on trade credit. Similarly firms that registered significant stock market increases are predicted to have reduced their sales on trade credit, prior to the increase. These effects are predicted to be more pronounced in industries in which the adverse selection effects are stronger, such as those with very heterogenous products or those with substantial research and development expenses.
The theory also has implications for developing economies. Trade credit plays an important role in providing finance to many firms in developing countries.Our analysis suggests that suppliers in these countries act as financial intermediaries finance transactions which they may not not otherwise be able to finance directly. This is because, a seller needs to raise less capital to finance a transaction than a buyer. As a result, this type of intermediation is efficient because financing by trade credit economizes on the total amount that the buyer and the seller have to raise from the inefficient financial market. Our model predicts that this channel is particularly important in countries where suppliers have market power. Thus, our model predicts that trade credit in these countries is likely to be extended in countries that have high tariffs policies and small market sizes. The second seller advantage stems from the difficulties that both firms face in convincing the financial market of their true worth when there are adverse selection problems as in Myers and Majluf (1984) . In order for a transaction to take place on trade credit the seller needs to raise the production costs from the investor while the buyer needs to raise enough to cover both the production costs and the seller's markup. The seller is also in a position to offer different prices for cash and credit transactions. Equilibrium reflects the interaction of these effects and may often involve the use of trade credit.
V. Conclusion
We have analyzed these two aspects separately in order to isolate their implications. However the relending and the adverse selection problems will normally coexist. In some respects they lead to different predictions, so their relative importance can be determined empirically. The study by work to distinguish these more sharply.
As discussed in section (IV) there are a number of empirical observations that are accounted for by our approach. Four of these are central. First, the theory accounts for the basic fact that trade credit is short term credit. Second, the theory accounts for firms simultaneously taking and extending credit to other firms with similar levels of creditworthiness. Third, the theory shows that the conventional advice that firms should "collect early and pay late," may be misguided advice.
Fourth, the theory can account for the fact that when firms prospects start to deteriorate, they often respond by increasing the extent to which they offer trade credit to their buyers. Fifth, the theory predicts the greater use of trade credit by suppliers in developing countries, particularly in countries with high tariffs and uncompetitive markets. In such countries intermediation is efficient because financing by trade credit economizes on the total amount that the buyer and the seller have to raise from the inefficient financial market.
VI. Appendix
Let x be the proportion of a sale to a high type buyer, that the investor will fund. If a seller who actually has a buyer of type i is thought to have a buyer of type h, then the payoff definitions are given as,
We need to verify that,
which is again true. In order to have π ll − π lh > 0, we need,
. This will be true if, x < x 1 , where
Notice that x 1 is strictly between zero and one. In order to have π hh −π hl > 0, we need
This will be true if x > x 2 , where x 2 = 1 −
For these expression to be mutually compatible, we need x 1 > x > x 2 . After some algebra we find that
Accordingly these condition are compatible. To construct the proof we need to be concerned about both participation constraints, and incentive compatibility constraints. For the current equilibrium to hold, two conditions are crucial. First, the high type seller must prefer to participate,
. This generates a cost restriction of the form c < c 1 . Second, the high type seller must be willing to offer trade
This generates a cost restriction of the form c < c 2 .
Buyers strategies: The low type buyer is treated fairly by the investor, and so prefers whichever is lower, the cash price p c or the credit price p k . Hence they take the cash price. The high type buyer will pick p k if he faces a cost of at least ε, due to adverse selection.
Sellers strategies: Consider the low type seller. He receives pooled pricing from the investor so the question is, will this be enough to cause a deviation? He loses ε on sales to the low type buyer, by not charging the full 1 as a cash price. However if the buyer chooses p k , the seller gains by being pooled by the investor. For ε small enough, the loss on the cash sale is smaller than the benefit on the financing side of the credit sales, and there is no incentive to deviate.
The high type seller participation constraint reduces to a critical cost level c 1 , such that c < c 1 .
In the equilibrium the high type seller earns a profit of π s (h, p, 1 − ε, 1).
Alternative 1. The high type seller could instead charge a price of 1 and only sell for cash, generating profits of π s (h, p, 1, ∅). In order to raise c for one period, he will have to give up f (s, p, 1) = c/(
A s + 1), to the investor. The high type seller will be indifferent between, forgoing the sale and financing it by the sale of equity, if
This solves for c 1 as,
Alternative 2. The high type seller might charge a price p which is the highest cash only price, that the high type buyer will accept. This generates profits of π s (h, p, p, ∅). Hence, the second requirement is that π
There is a cost level (c 2 ) such that this condition is satisfied with indifference.
Should the high type seller switch the cash price from 1 − ε to p? This reduces expected revenue by 1 − p − ε/2. The gain is equal to the expected adverse selection cost of raising c from the investor. The cost K, to a high type firm of raising c from the investor is,
Substituting for f (s, p, 1) and solving, yields the expected cost at 
The expected cost of adverse selection is less than the loss in revenue 1 − p − ε/2 if c < c 2 . To find c 2 , set 1 − p = K/2, and solve,
So when c < c 2 , the high type seller will not deviate. Thus neither alternative strategy pays for the high type seller. We also check for nonmimicry. To show that the low type seller does not mimic the high type requires that π s (l, l, 1, 1) ≥ π s (l, l, p, ∅). The dominance is clear because the high type firm obtains p c < 1 per transaction, whereas the low type firm obtains 1, not being subject to any adverse selection costs.
The high type buyer does not mimic the low. When facing the high seller there is no choice, just cash. When facing the low type seller, the high type buyer is better off paying 1 on credit rather than 1 − ε in cash. This avoids the adverse selection problem.
A seller raising money from the investor is treated as being low type. Thus for the low type seller raising money is a zero net present value transaction. Accordingly he is willing to offer the good at the buyers reservation price, and leave it to the buyer to decide whether the payment of 1 is made in cash or on credit.
Finding c 3 . Does the high type seller prefer to set (p c = 1 − ε, p k = 1) rather than charging a cash price p? If he did so, the seller would expect to supply credit half the time. Given the investor's belief that only low type sellers provide credit, the expected cost of supplying trade credit (K ) is given by
In the candidate equilibrium the high type seller would rather lose 1 − p than incur the expected adverse selection cost, given in (19). So setting 1 − p = K /2, substituting for p, and solving yields, 
To have c 3 < c 4 , we need it to be the case that
In order for this to hold, there must be a relatively small degree of adverse selection for the buyers, and a high degree for the sellers. Once again there are two important restrictions on costs. First, the high type seller must not prefer to cut the cash price in order to induce high type buyers to buy, so π s (h, l, 1, ∅) ≥ π s (h, l, p, ∅).
The point of indifference is denoted c 5 . Second, the high type seller must not be able to improve his profits by offering trade credit, so π s (h, l, 1, ∅) ≥ π s (h, l, 1, 1). The point of indifference is denoted c 6 . Since the high type firms do not approach the investor, the participation constraints are trivial.
The low type seller will not want to mimic the high type seller, since he gains by being able to trade with the high type buyer. Thus, π s (l, l, 1, 1) ≥ π s (l, l, 1, ∅). A seller raising money from the investor is treated as being low type. Thus for the low type seller raising money is a zero net present value matter. Accordingly he will simply offer the good at the buyer's reservation price, and leave it to the buyer to decide whether the payment of 1 is made for cash or on credit. 
Note that c 5 = c 4 .
Finding c 6 . The high type seller can also deviate by also offering a credit price of 1 and reducing his cash price to 1 − ε. The seller's gain, when encountering a high type buyer is then 1 − c. His cost is equal to the expected adverse selection cost of raising c from the investor. This cost to a high type seller of raising c from the investor is equal to f (s, l, 1) − c s h A s + 1 (s h A s + 1) .
Substituting for f (s, l, 1) = c s l As+1
, and solving yields the expected cost of adverse selection of
Costs of deviating exceed gains, 1 − c, when c > c 6 , where c 6 = (s l A s + 1) (s h A s + 1) .
Explanation of Corollary (1). To see that the first part is correct, note that c 1 is roughly 1, and c 2 approaches +∞. Hence the (2) equilibrium is likely to be consistent. Next note that c 3 approaches +∞, which rules out the (3) equilibrium. Finally note that c 6 will approach 1, which makes the (4) equilibrium unlikely.
To see that the second part is correct, note that c 1 is strictly less than 1, but c 2 approaches zero, so the (2) equilibrium will not be satisfied. Next note that c 3 approaches 0, and c 4 approaches 1, which means that the (3) equilibrium is very likely to be consistent, and it makes the (4) equilibrium unlikely. For there to be no trade between a high type seller and a high type buyer, as in the (4) equilibrium, requires a balancing of effects. There must be serious adverse selection on both sides of the market.
